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 2 
I clearly remember the day the Supreme Court announced its decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges.1 My wife and I were overjoyed, as it was our first realization of the power of the Supreme 
Court to, in one motion, create a better nation. We celebrated as her neighbors, two gay men who 
had lived together for decades, finally married on a stunning Tennessee summer day. It was the 
sweetest flavor of irony; Tennessee, an appellant in the suit and defender of marriage inequality,2 
was forced to legally recognize this couple’s love. 
LGBTQIA3 advocates rejoiced,4 with a sense that the fight for gay rights (and LGBTQIA 
rights more broadly) had been “won.” While a subset of conservatives protested, Republicans more 
broadly silently accepted this decision.5 As is so often the case, the sense of accomplishment 
following Obergefell gave way to a sort of complacency.6 
The short-sightedness in declaring total victory for the LGBTQIA rights movement should 
have been clear from the beginning. In the years to follow, so-called “bathroom bills” would 
proliferate across the country,7 attempting to deny transgender persons their right to live as they 
know themselves to be. It was not until 2020 that the Supreme Court handed down Bostock v. 
 
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
2 Id. at 653. 
3 “LGBTQIA” stands for “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex, Asexual.”  
4 See Editorial Board, A Profound Ruling Delivers Justice on Gay Marriage , N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/opinion/a-profound-ruling-delivers-justice-on-gay-marriage.html (last visited 
May 5, 2021). 
5 Rachel Larimore, Conservative Reaction to Marriage Ruling is Mixed ,  SLATE (June 26, 2015), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/06/gay-marriage-ruling-conservative-reaction-is-mixed-and-opponents-
quibble-with-legal-reasoning.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2021). 
6 Katy Dolan, The Danger of Complacency after Obergefell , HUFFINGTON POST (December 6, 2017), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-danger-of-complacency_b_8353728 (last visited Mar. 29, 2021). 
7 Joellen Kralik, Bathroom Bill Legislative Tracking , NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(October 24, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-bill-legislative-tracking635951130.aspx 
(last visited May 5, 2021). 
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Clayton County,8 extending workplace legal protections to gay and transgender persons.9 
Meanwhile, lethal hate crimes against transgender people hit an all-time high in 2020.10 
While Obergefell extended the “constellation of benefits that the States have linked to 
marriage” to married gay persons,11 the legal protections for unmarried gay couples, as compared 
to their heterosexual counterparts, remain far from functionally equal. Importantly, Obergefell 
does little to advance parental recognition rights for unmarried gay couples.  
Though Obergefell is, doubtless, a clear victory for the LGBTQIA rights movement, the 
current state of parental recognition for unwed same-sex couples remains an issue.  To some extent, 
this vindicates advocates, like the Gay Liberation Front, that questioned whether centralizing 
marriage was the proper strategy for the movement.12 Despite the much-deserved rejoicing 
observed after Obergefell, the fight for LGBTQIA rights in the family law arena is far from over.  
This article proposes that, while Obergefell  is a clear victory for gay liberation, its ruling 
does little for the growing number of gay couples starting their families outside of marriage. More 
specifically, Obergefell is a victory for gay marital rights, but gay liberation, including gay 
parental recognition, is largely a work-in progress. Marriage rates have reached historic lows13 
 
8 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
9 Id. at 1754. 
10 An Epidemic of Violence: Fatal Violence Against Transgender and Gender Non -Conforming People in the United 
States in 2020, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (November 19, 2020), https://hrc-prod-requests.s3-us-west-
2.amazonaws.com/FatalViolence-2020Report-Final.pdf?mtime=20201119101455&focal=none (last visited May 5, 
2021). 
11 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670. 
12 The Gay Liberation Front (“GLF”), founded in the wake of the Stonewall Riots, initially suggested challenging 
the marital unit, believing the nuclear family reinforces heteronormative principles. Gay Liberation Front, Manifesto 
1 (1971, rev.1978), https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/pwh/glf-london.asp (last visited May 5, 2021). Conversely, 
other activists believed that granting same-sex marriage, itself, would be a rebuke of heteronormative values. Erik 
Eckholm, The Same-Sex Couple Who Got a Marriage License in 1971 , N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/us/the-same-sex-couple-who-got-a-marriage-license-in-1971.html (last visited 
May 5, 2021). For a legal analysis of this issue, see Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 
50 (1994). 
13 Sally C. Curtin and Paul D. Sutton, Marriage Rates in the United States, 1990-2018, CENTER FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL (April 28, 2020) (last visited May 5, 2021), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/marriage_rate_2018/marriage_rate_2018.htm (last visited May 5, 2021). 
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even as birth rates decline.14 The percentage of cohabiting unmarried parents has continued to 
rise.15 As the share of unmarried parents rises, parental recognition will naturally depend less on 
the marital presumption. As there will often be at least one non-biological parent in a same-sex 
couple, a robust statutory framework extending parental recognition under a more functional test 
will become of greater importance. Therefore, legislators should focus on functional definitions of 
parentage to protect the rights of unwed same-sex couples. This article emphasizes the need for 
updating state adoption laws, examines the jurisprudential development of parental recognition 
rights, and the ways this area of the law has historically failed unwed gay couples. Specifically, 
this article posits that failure to include functional schemes of parental recognition, such as de facto 
parenthood or “holding out” provisions, comes to the exclusion of unwed, same-sex parents. 
In addition to the gaps left by the current scheme, there is an issue of unequal access to 
parental recognition. While straight, unmarried couples will typically establish their parentage 
through biology, the biological route is nearly always unavailable to at least one member of a 
same-sex relationship. In this sense, equality cannot be achieved by equal application of statutory 
schemes that exclude functional definitions of parentage. While there is an entire jurisprudential 
body to guide unwed biological fathers on how to establish parentage,16 there is no equivalent 
Supreme Court guidance for unwed non-biological gay parents. Finally, although second-parent 
adoption exists in a number of states,17 the statutory schemes often leave too much room for 
 
14 Brady E. Hamilton, Joyce A. Martin, and Michelle J.K. Osterman, Births: Provisional Data for 2019 , CENTER 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL (May 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsrr/vsrr-8-508.pdf (last visited May 5, 
2021). 
15 Gretchen Livingston, The Changing Profile of Unmarried Parents, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (April 25, 2018), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/04/Unmarried-Parents-Full-Report-PDF.pdf (last 
visited May 5, 2021). 
16 For a summary on unwed father parental recognition, see Brent Potash, Unequal Protection: Examining the 
Judiciary's Treatment of Unwed Fathers, 34 Touro L. Rev. 649 (2018). 
17 Legal Recognition for LGBT Families, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS (2019), 
https://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Legal_Recognition_of_LGBT_Families.pdf (last visited 
May 5, 2021). 
 5 
judicial discretion, potentially to the detriment of gay parents, unmarried parents, and especially 
gay, unmarried parents.  
Other barriers exist as well. Laypeople avoid legal formalities for a diverse set of reasons. 
Family Court is, all too-often, adversarial, even as it involves the most intimate areas of our lives. 
It is often expensive. When a parent already knows the child to be her own, or naively assumes the 
relationship with their partner will never break down, the psychological parent might not even 
sufficiently consider the necessity of legal formalities.18 Despite the certainties in which attorneys 
often speak, we know that there is a gamble every time we enter the legal system. 
A clear example of this legal uncertainty is evident from Hawkins v. Grese.19 There, two 
unmarried lesbian women lived as co-parents with their baby girl, B.G., for nine years.20 The 
couple never married, and the non-biological mother did not formally adopt B.G.21 Yet, the non-
biological mother, Denise Hawkins, held herself out as a mother to B.G. She did this first by co-
parenting B.G. and cohabiting with Grese for seven-years, followed by an informal custody 
arrangement for two years.22 Hawkins’ relationship with Grese then disintegrated.23 
Hawkins petitioned for custody and visitation with B.G.24 The Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court, after considering extensive psychological testimony, concluded that Hawkins 
should be awarded joint custody and visitation rights.25 On appeal, the Virginia Appellate Court 
held that, because Virginia had rejected de facto parenthood, Hawkins was merely person with a 
 
18 See, e.g., A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1066 (Mass. 2006) (noting that plaintiff never formalized a second-
parent adoption because she believed a threat to her parental status would only be a “worst -case scenario”). 
19 Hawkins v. Grese, 809 S.E.2d 441 (Va. Ct. App. 2018). 





25 Id at 467-68. 
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legitimate interest,26 and could not overcome the presumption of biological parentage.27 The Court 
held, that “pre-Obergefell, different-sex marriages did not automatically result in the spouses 
becoming legal parents of each other's children and the analysis of the Obergefell majority opinion 
does not compel a different conclusion with respect to same-sex marriages, far less unmarried 
couples of any sexual orientation.”28 
The level of legal uncertainty demonstrated above is unacceptable. To ensure parental 
recognition of unwed same-sex parents, it is imperative that states adopt parentage laws modeled 
on the 2017 Amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act. Its functional definitions of “parentage,” 
which provide alternatives to adoption, the marital presumption, and biological recognition, will 
protect the rights of both unwed same-sex-parents and their psychological children. The UPA 
(2017) accomplishes this by including recognition of de facto parenthood,29 in addition to the 
upgrading the “holding out” provision30 that was first adopted in the UPA (1973).31 
Part I of this article outlines the Supreme Court’s law of parental recognition. Part II 
explores the traditional statutory avenues of parental recognition. Part III examines the 
insufficiency of these avenues as applied to unmarried same-sex couples. Part IV explores the 





26 Id at 483, citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1. 
27 Id at 484. 
28 Id at 448. 
29 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017). 
30 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017). 




A. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Parental Recognition 
Parental recognition is but the first step to recognizing parental authority.32 While the 
Supreme Court’s parental authority jurisprudence has been of general application, its parental 
recognition jurisprudence has focused on unwed biological fathers.33 A natural consequence of 
this fact is a jurisprudential focus on biology and marriage that leaves functional parenthood as an 
afterthought. This entangling of legitimacy and parentage,34 regardless of what purpose it once 
served, naturally excludes unwed, same-sex parents, demonstrating the limits of focusing on the 
marital presumption or biology.  
In Stanley v. Illinois,35 the Supreme Court grappled with the rights of unwed fathers. Joan 
and Peter Stanley, an unwed couple,36 conceived three children together,37 and cohabitated for 
several periods over the course of eighteen years.38 Pursuant to Illinois law, after Joan died, the 
children became wards of the state,39 placed under the custody of a court-appointed guardian.40 
Peter, despite being a biological father active in his children’s lives,41 was given no parental rights 
under Illinois law.42 It was not that Peter’s parental rights were terminated; instead, the Illinois 
Supreme Court found Peter did not have parental rights to terminate.43 The justification of the law 
 
32 For an excellent exploration of the distinctions between these frameworks, See Douglas NeJaime, The 
Constitution of Parenthood, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 279-81 (2020). 
33 Potash, supra note 16. 
34 For an entire article devoted to this subject, see Joanna L. Grossman, Tying Parentage to Marital Status for 
Lesbian Co-Parents, 20. Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 671 (2012). 
35 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).  
36 In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970). 
37 Id.. 
38 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 651 
42 Id. 
43 In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d at 815 (“In any event, Stanley cannot show himself to be entitled to the rights accorded 
legal custodians and guardians to retain custody, since the class of legal custodians and guardians consists solely of 
persons to whom those rights have been affirmatively granted by the court.”). 
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supposed that the father’s failure to marry the mother was, itself, proof that the father was 
neglectful, and therefore unfit to parent or qualify as a parent.44 
On appeal, the issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether unwed fathers 
could be deprived of their children absent a demonstration of unfitness.45 According to Peter, 
being denied his children absent this showing deprived him of the equal protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, since married fathers and unwed mothers were not subject to this 
assumption of unfitness.46 The Court agreed, and held that the statute was unconstitutional under 
both the equal protection clause and the due process clause.47  
The Court concluded that, despite the Illinois statute, “Stanley was entitled to a hearing 
on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him.”48 The Court held that the 
state’s reliance on unwed status as proof of parental unfitness  as applied to men, but not women, 
violates the Equal Protection clause.49 In addressing the due process rights of unwed fathers, the 
Court noted that Stanley was both a biological father and an active parent to the children,50 and 
that taking his children from him without a hearing violated his rights to due process.51 This due 
process interest-- deriving both from biological status plus parental conduct-- would become 
colloquially known as the “biology plus” test.52 
Stanley was followed by Quillon v. Walcott,53 a case where a putative father challenged a 
Georgia law that allowed for adoption of the child by unilateral consent of the biological mother 
 
44 Stanley, 405 U.S. at  646. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 657-58. 
48 Id. at 649 (emphasis added). 
49 Id. at 658. 
50 Id. at 651 
51 Id. at 649. 
52 See, e.g., Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 1483, 1499 (2018); Deborah L. 
Forman, Unwed Fathers and Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis in Context ., 72 Tex. L. Rev. 967, 975 (1994). 
53 Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
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if the father had not legitimated the child.54 The biological father, Leon, had never married the 
biological mother, Ardell, and the couple never established a home together.55 When the biological 
mother’s husband, Randall Walcott, petitioned for adoption, Leon objected.56 In doing so, Leon 
did not seek legal or physical custody of the child.57 Analyzing the case, the Court summarized 
Stanley as balancing the state’s interest in caring for children where the unwed father is unfit, 
versus the fit father’s interest in care and custody of his children.58 The Court acknowledged that 
Stanley did not address the situation before it in Quillon, where the state’s interest in caring for its 
children was greater.59 Ultimately, the Court held the due process protections for unwed fathers 
apply only where the father takes on “any significant responsibility with respect to the daily 
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child.”60  
This holding defines the outer boundaries of the unwed father’s constitutional rights, rather 
than a limitation of those rights. Unlike in Stanley, where the father was shown to be a fit, active 
psychological parent,61 the father in Quillon failed to take any meaningful responsibility over the 
child’s life and, thus, constitutional protections did not apply despite the biological connection.62  
Caban v. Mohammad, decided only a year after Quillon, involved a challenge to a New 
York statute that gave mothers the right to withhold consent to an adoption without extending that 
same right to unwed putative fathers.63 Abdiel Caban had fathered two children with Maria 
Mohammad while they lived together.64 Sometime after the couple broke up, Maria wanted her 
 
54 Id. at 249. 
55 Id. at 247.  
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id at 248. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 256.  
61 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 666. 
62 Quillon, 434 U.S. at 256. 
63Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).  
64 Id. at 382. 
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new husband to adopt Abdiel’s natural children.65 These children, aged four and six, had spent 
substantial time living with Abdiel.66 When Maria consented to the adoption of the children, 
Abdiel challenged the constitutionality of the New York statute, primarily on equal protection 
grounds.67 The Court found the scheme violated equal protection, as it did not extend that same 
veto right to unwed fathers who had taken on that “significant responsibility” emphasized in 
Quillon.68 The Court emphasized that the right to parenthood for unwed fathers can be created 
where the biological father assumes the responsibility of acting as a social father.69 
Lehr v. Robertson required the Court to once again consider the rights of unwed fathers, 
this time in a challenge to the natural mother’s husband’s adoption of the child .70 The natural 
father, Lehr, claimed that Robertson had interfered with his attempts to connect with their child to 
satisfy the “biology plus” test.71 The State of New York, supporting Robertson, argued that Lehr 
had failed to financially support the natural mother, including during pregnancy.72 In addition to 
his failure to support the mother,73 Lehr had not registered with the state’s putative father registry.74 
According to the State, Lehr lacked both the moral and financial will to establish a relationship 
with the mother through marriage, which demonstrated his lack of fitness as a father.75 The Court 
ultimately sided with the state, basing its decision on two key points. First, The Court emphasized 
 
65 Id. at 383. 
66 Id. at 389. 
67 Id. at 388. 
68 Id. at 393-94. 
69 Id. at 394 (“The effect of New York's classification is to discriminate against unwed fathers even when their 
identity is known and they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child.”). 
70 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 249-250 (1983). 
71 Id. at 269 (“According to Lehr, from the time [the mother] Lorraine was discharged from the hospital until August 
1978, she concealed her whereabouts from him. During this time Lehr never ceased his efforts to locate Lorraine 
and [the child] Jessica and achieved sporadic success until August 1977, after which time he was unable to locate 
them at all. On those occasions when he did determine Lorraine's location, he visited with her and her children to the 
extent she was willing to permit it.”). 
72 Brief for Appellee Attorney General of the State of New York, Lehr v. Robertson, 1982 WL 1044648, 18. 
73 Lehr at 252. 
74 Id. at 250-51. 
75 Id. at 263. 
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that Lehr could have signaled his intent to parent the child by marrying the child’s mother.76 
Second, Lehr could have signaled his intent by registering as a putative father.77 The Court held 
that biological connection allowed the father a chance to step in as a responsible parent, but that 
failure to seize that chance does not afford the father the Constitutional protections of parenthood.78  
 This line of cases is problematic for LGBTQIA couples, married or otherwise. These cases 
stand for the principle that per se denial of parentage based on failure to marry the person giving 
birth is unconstitutional,79 but that failure to marry that person or otherwise indicate an intent to 
establish a relationship with the child may be used to demonstrate parental unfitness.80 In these 
cases, biology did not make a man a legally-recognized father, but it provided him a chance to 
establish himself as one.81 The prominence of biology in establishing parenthood for an unmarried 
partner is limiting LGBTQIA couples.   In an unmarried heterosexual coupling, both parents might 
have a biological or genetic connection to the child. Conversely, in an unmarried same-sex 
coupling, typically only one “parent” will have a biological or genetic connection to the child.  
Of course, same sex couples now have the option to legally marry to satisfy Lehr. However, 
this is not a requirement for heterosexual couples, where the biological mother is a natural, legally -
recognized parent, and the father has a legal right to satisfy the “biology-plus” test. Hence, equal 
application of the unwed father cases to heterosexual and same-sex couples creates unequal results. 
The unwed father cases help the heterosexual biological father, but do little to protect a 
psychological, non-biological parent, which generally describes at least one parent in a same-sex 
 
76 Id. at 264. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 262. 
79 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649-50. 
80 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263. 
81 Grossman, supra note 34, at 704. 
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relationship. This forces the same-sex couple to either marry, or reside in a state which grants 
second-parent adoption.82 
Applying the Lehr framework further hinders the gay non-biological parent’s rights by 
allowing “failure to marry” as evidence of unfitness to parent .83 While this applies equally to both 
heterosexual and homosexual couples, the changing dynamic of the American family-- that is, the 
increasing number of unwed parents-- requires a more functional definition of “parentage.” 
Part II: Traditional Avenues for Parental Recognition 
A. Previous Iterations of the Marital Presumption of Parentage 
Marriage is the primary means to establish the non-birth giver’s parentage. Under previous 
iterations of the UPA, a husband is rebuttably presumed to be the father of any child born of his 
wife during the marriage.84 In a number of states this presumption survives even against the actual 
biological father.85 Even if the biological father asserts his rights, a child born to a married 
heterosexual couple may be rebuttably presumed to be the husband’s child86 without violating the 
due process rights of the biological father. The marital presumption has been incorporated into the 
UPA since its inception.87 The UPA (1973) permitted a child, the natural mother, and presumptive 
father to bring actions declaring the existence or non-existence of a father-child relationship.88 It 
also, rather clairvoyantly, did not provide standing for putative fathers not benefitting from the 
marital presumption to assert their parental rights to children born of the marriage.89 The UPA 
 
82 Id. at 702. 
83 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649-50. 
84 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 (UNIF. 
LAW COMM'N 2002). 
85 Ala. Code § 26-17-607(a) (2021); Cal. Fam. Code §7540 (2021); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-4-107(1) (2021); Iowa 
Code § 600B.41A(3)(a) (2021); Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.070(2) (2021); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-607(1) (2021). 
86 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989). 
87 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973). 
88 Id. See also Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 
102 W. Va. L. Rev. 547, 567 (2000). 
89 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973). 
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(1973) granted standing to challenge the marital presumption only to the child, his natural mother, 
or a man presumed to be the natural father,90 and the presumption could only be rebutted by clear 
and convincing evidence.91 
The UPA (2002) was substantially similar to the UPA (1973) in this regard, although it 
lowered the statutory period to challenge the presumption of paternity from five years to two,92 
and allowed both presumptive and putative fathers to challenge the presumption.93 The shortened 
statute of limitations protects the relationship of the husband and child by limiting the time in 
which a challenge may be brought.94 
While the gendered language of the marital presumption in past UPAs would be equally 
applied to same-sex couples in the wake of Pavan v. Smith,95 the martial presumption is of 
diminishing importance due to the growing share of unmarried cohabiting parents,96 and nearly 







91 Id. at §4(b). 
92 Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973) with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 
(UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002). 
93 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 602(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002). 
94 Id. at § 607. 
95 Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (extending the marital presumption to same-sex couples). 
96 Gretchen Livingston, The Changing Profile of Unmarried Parents, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (April 25, 2018), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/04/Unmarried-Parents-Full-Report-PDF.pdf (last 
visited May 5, 2021). 
97 2019 Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement ,  UNITED STATES CENSUS 
BUREAU (2019), https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/time-series/demo/cps/cps-asec.2019.html (last visited May 
5, 2021). U.S. Census Bureau Releases CPS Estimates of Same-Sex Households, United States Census Bureau (Nov. 
19, 2019), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/same-sex-households.html (last visited May 5, 
2021). 
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B. Previous Iterations of Parentage by Biological Tie 
Absent surrogacy or IVF arrangements, the person giving birth to a child 98 is presumed to 
be that child’s parent.  With that presumption comes the full suite of rights, responsibilities, and 
social recognition associated with parenthood.99 As paternity testing is typically not required at 
birth, and paternity can be asserted via a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (“VAP”), 
heterosexual unmarried men may often claim biological father status without further 
verification.100 Voluntary acknowledgments will typically prevail even against challenge by 
putative fathers or a later denial of parentage by the signatory.101 
The UPA (1973) included a provision acknowledging blood-genetic testing, but provided 
little guidance to courts on how to consider genetic evidence.102 The relevant provision indicated 
that courts may weigh the “statistical probability of the alleged father’s paternity,” but did not 
direct courts as to the amount of weight to be given to genetic evidence against other presumptions 
of paternity.103 Likewise, the UPA (2002) merely directed courts to determine the “best interests 
of the child” when determining whether to order genetic testing where a child has a presumptive 




98 The UPA refers to the mother who gives birth.  E.g.,  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a) (UNIF. 
LAW COMM'N 2002). I use the word “person” to recognize that transgender men may give birth. 
99 Samantha Bei-wen Lee, The Equal Right to Parent: Protecting the Rights of Gay and Lesbian, Poor, and 
Unmarried Parents, 41 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 631, 636 (2017); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not 
Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-first Century, 5 Stan. 
J.C.R. & C.L. 201, 227 (2009). 
100 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 302 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002).  Under the 2002 UPA, the Acknowledgement 
must state that there is no presumed father of the child, such as a husband of the mother. § 302(a)(3).  
101 E.g., In the Matter of Gendron, 950 A.2d 151 (N.H. 2008); Buccieri v. Campagna, 889 A.2d 1220 (P.a. Super. Ct. 
2005); Van Weelde v. Van Weelde, 110 So. 3d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
102 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 12(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973). 
103 Glennon, supra note 88, at 557.  
104 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 608(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002). 
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C. Previous Iterations of Parentage by Adoption 
Finally, parentage can be established via adoption. Adoption guarantees all the same rights 
and responsibilities of parentage guaranteed to married, biological parents. Adoption laws are a 
statutory creation and vary greatly by state.105 Despite the variance, such statutes typically include 
residency requirements,106 age requirements,107 and a home study designed to ensure safe and 
stable child placement, in accordance with the “best interests of the child .”108  
Particularly relevant to unmarried same-sex couples are second-parent adoption laws. Like 
other adoption statutes, the requirements and availability vary greatly from state to state.109 
Second-parent adoption creates a process by which an unmarried partner can legally adopt the 
other partner’s biological or adoptive child, without requiring the termination of the other parent’s 
parental rights.110 This makes it an effective tool for same-sex couples in cases where the non-
biological parent has no legal claim to parentage. Second-parent adoption bears full faith and credit 
protection, and must be honored in every state.111 Final adoptions may not be contested by a party 
to the adoption absent extraordinary circumstances, and North Carolina appears to be the only 
appellate court that has invalidated a final adoption in this context.112 The North Carolina Supreme 
Court, however, did so because the state legislature did not include second-parent adoption in its 
 
105 Legal Recognition of LGBT Familes, supra note 17. 
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(invalidating a second parent adoption by the same-sex partner of the birth-giving mother). 
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statutory scheme,113 while emphasizing that North Carolina adoption law is wholly statutory.114 
Thus, the Court held that second parent adoption by a same-sex partner was an impermissible 
procedure.115 
Availability of second-parent adoption, especially for unmarried couples, varies. Only 
fifteen states, plus the District of Columbia, have state statutes or appellate decisions allowing 
same-sex second-parent adoption for unmarried couples.116 Fourteen other states have certain 
counties that have previously granted parental recognition this way to unmarried same sex 
couples.117 
Conversely, appellate courts in at least seven states have categorically held that unmarried 
couples may not practice second-parent adoption under their state’s statutory frameworks.118 
Additionally, Utah prohibits cohabiting non-marital couples from adopting under their statutes.119 
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D. Previous Iterations of Parentage by “Holding Out” 
Both the UPA (1973) and UPA (2002) included provisions for the “holding out” presumption 
of paternity.120 The UPA (1973) provided that a man could be presumed to a child’s parent when 
he resides with the child and “openly holds out the child as his natural child .”121 No statutory 
period was attached to the holding out provision, and therefore, it was widely subject to judicial 
discretion.122 The presumption could be asserted to exist by any party, and only rebutted by a clear 
and convincing showing.123 If the standard was met, this person would be assumed to be the 
“natural parent.”124  
Questions were “naturally” raised as to the meaning of “natural child.” It appears that the 
drafters of the provision assumed “natural” to mean “biological,”125 but some courts interpreted it 
otherwise. For example, the California Supreme Court came to a different conclusion in In re 
Nicholas H.126 There, the Court was forced to examine the state’s statutory scheme, which was 
based around the UPA (1973).127 At the trial court, a father asserting he was entitled to the holding 
out presumption of parentage admitted he was not the biological father.128 The trial court held that 
this did not preclude him from the presumption,129 but the appellate court disagreed and 
reversed.130 When the case reached the California Supreme Court, the Court examined both the 
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holding out provision,131 and the provision granting courts authority to balance which presumption 
prevails when two presumptions are applicable.132 Reasoning that the legislature would not have 
adopted a scheme potentially granting parental rights to non-biological fathers unless it intended 
to do so, the Court concluded that “natural” need not mean “biological.”133  
The UPA (2002)’s holding out provision was substantively similar to the UPA (1973)’s 
version,134 but required that a putative parent hold him or herself out as a parent, and reside with 
the child, for a period of two years.135 The UPA (2002) was also modified to apply equally to both 
paternity and maternity determinations.136 This change was particularly beneficial to lesbian 
mothers. Following enactment of statutes mirroring the language of the UPA (2002), several state 
courts found that lesbian women, without a biological connection the child, may be parents to a 
child when they hold themselves out as the parent to a child whom they planned to raise with their 
partner.137 
The marital presumption and holding out presumption-- unlike parentage by biological tie-- 
recognize a functional meaning of parenthood by focusing on the social relationship between the 
parent and the child. By focusing on the functional relationships between family memebers, these 
presumptions protect both same-sex parents and their children, without requiring the legal 
formalities associated with adoption. Additionally, the holding-out presumption protects the 
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parental rights of those couples who decline to marry, who remain a growing percentage of 
American families.138 
Part III  
A. The Insufficiency of Protecting Gay Families with the Marital Presumption 
Although it seems doubtlessly clear that the marital presumption does little to protect 
parental rights of unmarried gay couples, it is possible that it does not adequately protect married 
gay couples.  
While Obergefell guaranteed marriage equality, the Court did not squarely address whether 
the marital presumption of parentage extends to gay couples. Pavan v. Smith got closer to 
answering this question in the affirmative, by holding that an Arkansas law requiring the name of 
a mother’s husband be placed on a child’s birth certificate, while not extending the same right to 
gay spouses, violated Obergefell.139 Yet the Court, by relying heavily on the rights guaranteed by 
state statutes, did not totally foreclose the possibility that it was only the disparate treatment that 
violates Obergefell.140 The Court emphasized that the marital presumption is a product of state 
law, stating that Arkansas “uses [birth] certificates to give married parents a form of legal 
recognition not available to unmarried parents. Having made that choice, Arkansas may not . . . 
deny married same-sex couples that recognition.”141  
This language indicates that a state may, consistent with Obergefell, deny gay couples the 
marital presumption by instead requiring adoption, so long as the treatment is not disparate as 
compared to straight married couples.142 Several lower Courts have interpreted Pavan’s mandate 
 
138  Curtain, supra. note 13. 
139 Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2076. 
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as such. The Seventh Circuit recently upheld a District Court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction 
requiring equal application of the marital presumption to same-sex couples,143 while specifically 
emphasizing that equal presumption of parentage does not mandate applying a rule enforcing the 
marital presumption.144 The Arizona Supreme Court deployed identical reasoning, to an identical 
result, with its state’s own marital presumption law; the Court held that the state must extend the 
presumption to same-sex couples for the sake of providing equal protection, but not going so far 
as to require the marital presumption outside the statutory scheme.145  
The idea that states would consider repealing their marriage presumption in order to deny 
same sex couples a marital parentage presumption is clearly alarmist and extremely unlikely. 
Doing so would require every parent to either complete DNA testing, or sign a voluntary 
acknowledgement of parentage. Regardless, this presents a novel constitutional thought 
experiment. Without the marital presumption, a heterosexual parental couple could rely on 
biological parental recognition to protect their parental rights. Conversely, the vast majority of 
same-sex couples will have at least one parent without a biological connection to the child. 
Therefore, even same-sex married couples would face uncertainty in establishing parentage.  
B. Biological Parental Recognition Does Not Sufficiently Protect Unwed Same-Sex 
Couples 
The limited ability for biological parental recognition to protect an unmarried gay person’s 
parental rights are obvious. In nearly all same-sex parental relationships, at least one psychological 
and intended parent will not be biologically related to the child. While the protections offered by 
 
143 Henderson v. Box, 947 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2020). 
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a biological parent, especially a biological mother, are robust, a non-biological mother or father 
will not benefit from genetic verification of parentage.  
Under some states’ schemes, biology becomes a central tool where parentage is determined 
by a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity.146 Prior iterations of the UPA required a putative 
father signing a VAP to be an actual biological parent.147 Applying this statute, a number of states 
have required that only biological fathers sign VAPs,148 and some state courts have deemed an 
acknowledgement fraudulent if the parent signs with knowledge that he is not the biological 
father.149 Other states, including Massachusetts, have taken the opposite approach and recognized 
VAPs validly executed by same-sex couples.150 The UPA (2017) takes the latter approach. It 
allows “presumed parents,” which includes parents benefitting from both the marital presumption 
and holding out presumption,151 to sign and be bound by a VAP, regardless of whether they are a 
same or cross-sex couple.152 
C. Agency Barriers to Same-Sex Adoption 
In states where second-parent adoption is unavailable, same-sex couples who wish to adopt 
a child may be required to turn to private agencies to do so. Private agencies are typically more 
selective in the child placement process.153 Even when second parent adoption is available, a home 
 
146 Merle E. Weiner, When a Parent is Not Apparent, 80 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 533, 547 (2019), citing UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT § 302(a)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002). 
147 Id. 
148 Weiner, supra note 146, citing Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent?: Revisting Equitable 
Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 
Brooklyn L. Rev. 55, 83 (2017);   UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002) (“a man 
claiming to be the genetic father of the child may sign an acknowledgment of paternity”).  
149 Weiner, supra note 146, n.54 (2019). 
150 Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d, 1133, 1139 (Mass. 2016). 
151 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301; §204; (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017);  
152 The official comment to UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 states that the revision to the UPA (2002) “furthers the 
goal of ensuring that the act applies equally to children born to same-sex couples[.]”. 
153 Samantha R. Lyew, Adoption and Foster Care Placement Policies: Legislatively Promoting the Best Interests of 
Children Amidst Competing Interests of Religious Freedom and Equal Proteciton For Same-Sex Couples, 42 J. Legis. 
186, 187 (2016). 
 22 
study will typically be required,154 except upon waiver of the court.155 Even when such waivers 
are permitted by law, extensive documentation, including submission of affidavits and letters in 
support of the adoption, will generally be required.156 
Home studies, unfortunately, may serve to the detriment of unwed, same sex couples.  
Heteronormative views of what makes for a “stable” home environment are pervasive, and even 
charitable adoptive agencies are not immune from widespread biases.157 This is particularly true 
among faith-based private adoption agencies.158 If the agency is affiliated with a particular 
religious group, they might cite to their religious beliefs as a reason to decline certain couples, 
including both the unwed, and the gay.159 While it is true that a religious agency may decline to 
place children with both heterosexual and homosexual couples, the impact on homosexual couples 
is disproportionate due to more limited ability to biologically conceive and, in fact, same-sex 
couples are approximately seven times more likely to adopt compared to their opposite-sex 
counterparts.160  
Despite studies indicating that children raised by same-sex couples are just as well adjusted 
as those raised by opposite-sex couples,161 some states have adopted, or are attempting to adopt, 
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laws which explicitly grant private adoption agencies the right to discriminate against same-sex or 
unwed couples based on their religious beliefs.162 In the first few months of 2021 alone, at least 
four such bills were introduced in state legislatures.163 Therefore, second parent adoption continues 
to prove to be an imperfect route for same sex unmarried couples to establish parentage. 
1. Fulton’s Threat to Unwed Same-Sex Couples 
In the years following Obergefell, pro-religious (or, to some, anti-gay)164 advocates have 
begun adopting Free Exercise challenges to accommodations for homosexual couples. Perhaps 
most famous among these challenges was Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission.165 There, the cakeshop and its owner, Jack Phillips, refused to bake a wedding cake 
for a same-sex couple, citing to his religious beliefs.166 This resulted in an investigation by the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission.167 The Commission found that Masterpiece Cakeshop had, on 
several occasions, discriminated against potential customers on the basis of their sexual 
orientation.168 The Supreme Court took little issue with the Commission’s conclusion. What the 
majority did object to, however, was the Commission’s hostility towards Phillips.169 During a 
public hearing discussing the case, a Commissioner stated that 
Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination 
throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust . . . [using 
religious beliefs] is one of the most despicable pieces rhetoric that people can use .  
. . to hurt others.170 
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 The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Commission’s determination.171 The Court 
held that government must remain neutral towards religious viewpoints in enforcement of laws of 
otherwise general applicability.172 Since the Commission’s decision was not neutral as to Phillips’ 
religious viewpoint, the Court held it violated the First Amendment.173  Since then, lower Courts 
have been forced to consider the exact extent to which religious beliefs can compromise LGBTQIA 
accommodations.  
 This legal tension has reached a new peak with the currently-pending Fulton v. City of 
Philadelphia.174 In March 2018, the City of Philadelphia blocked Catholic Social Services, a local 
Catholic adoption agency, from placing children in foster homes.175 The City did so due to Catholic 
Social Services’ policy excluding same-sex couples from foster-home licensure.176 In response, 
Catholic Social Services brought an action against the City, claiming that the City’s actions 
violated its First Amendment Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech rights.177 The Third 
Circuit held that plaintiffs failed to show that the City targeted plaintiffs for their religious 
beliefs.178 Instead, the Court believed that the City was acting in good faith to enforce its anti-
discrimination laws.179 The case is now pending before the Supreme Court. Fulton’s petitioners 
rely greatly on Masterpiece Cakeshop in their briefs,180 and are seeking a Free Exercise exception 
that would allow religious adoption agencies to deny foster parent applicants on the basis of sexual 
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orientation. Additionally, this case could provide an exception to grant adoptions to unmarried 
couples as well.181  
During oral arguments, the conservative justices, and even Justice Breyer, indicated that 
the government has a more compelling state interest in combatting racial discrimination than same-
sex discrimination, while Justice Kavanaugh flatly stated that the City of Philadelphia was 
“looking for a fight” and “looking for problems” by commanding all adoption agencies to screen 
same-sex couples.182 Even assuming, arguendo, that the charities are acting in good-faith based on 
their sincerely held religious beliefs, ruling in petitioner’s favor would create yet another structural 
barrier for same-sex couples seeking to adopt.  
 
Part IV: The Urgency of Adopting the UPA (2017) to Protect Unwed Same-Sex Couples 
 The uncertainty presented by Fulton, and deficiencies in many states’ statutes, makes 
adoption of the UPA (2017) all the more necessary to protect the rights of both same-sex parents 
and their children. Many current statutory regimes, including those based around prior versions of 
the UPA, are insufficient due to their failure to focus on the functional definitions of parentage.  
The UPA (2017) recognizes that parentage is not merely a product of biology,183 or the parent’s 
marital status,184 and that psychological parents should not have to adopt their own child. Instead, 
the UPA (2017) focuses squarely on the importance of the parent-child relationship. Its upgraded 
provisions will more effectively protect the rights of unwed, same-sex parents, and states should 
move forward with its adoption. 
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Three provisions are particularly protective of unwed, same-sex parents: the holding out 
provision;185 extension of de facto parenthood;186 and more inclusive voluntary assumption of 
parentage (VAP) provisions.187 Any one of these three now gender-neutral provisions could have 
potentially prevented the injustice seen in Hawkins, making the UPA (2017)’s currently limited 
enactment all the more unjust.188 
The newly revised UPA is, admittedly, imperfect. It fails to account for the fact that 
transgender men are capable of giving birth, and states which adopt UPA (2017) as otherwise 
written should be careful to apply gender-neutral terminology to provisions where it is not already 
employed. Similarly, provisions requiring notification to “a man who may be the genetic father of 
a child”189 should be replaced with “an individual who may be a genetic parent.” These provisions, 
however, may be easily fixed, and UPA (2017) remains a positive step towards gender neutrality.  
The revised UPA, with these subtle updates in mind, will bring states that adopt it into 
compliance of the promise of  Obergefell and Pavan, without the equal protection issues discussed 
earlier in this article. It can mitigate reliance on the marital presumption and biological ties, and 




A. The UPA (2017)’s Codification of De Facto Parenthood 
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The 2017 edition, for the first time in UPA history, includes provisions providing for de 
facto parenthood.190 De facto parenthood, an equitable doctrine already recognized in a number of 
jurisdictions,191 provides an avenue for parental recognition focused on the functional meaning of 
parenting. This functional approach recognizes the interpersonal meaning of “parentage,” to the 
benefit of both parents and children.  
Under Section 609, a Court considering a claim of de facto parentage should consider a 
number of factors. These include whether the individual bringing the claim (1) "resided with the 
child as a regular member of the child's household for a significant period"; (2) "engaged in 
consistent caretaking of the child"; (3) "undertook full and permanent responsibilities of a parent 
of the child without expectation of financial compensation"; (4) "held out the child as the 
individual's child"; and (5) "established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child which 
is parental in nature."192 The Court must consider whether another individual has functionally 
similar parental ties with the child, and, importantly, whether recognition of the de facto parentage 
is in the best interests in the child.193  In those jurisdictions that have recognized de facto 
parenthood, the entitlements of the de factor parent have varied.194   However the UPA (2017)’s 
approach grants the full suite of parental rights to these functional parents. 
The codification of de facto parenthood allows legislatures to grant parental rights to 
putative parents, rather than rely on judicial adoption or rejection of the remedy. In fact, the UPA 
(2017)  provides that a Court may deny genetic testing to putative fathers challenging another’s 
 
190 Joslin, supra note 183, at 592; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017). 
191 See, e.g., Conover v. Conover, 141 A.3d 31 (Md. 2016); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000); Holtzman v. 
Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). 
192 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017). 
193 Id. 
194 For example, in V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d at 554.  the New Jersey Supreme Court held that while the de facto 
parent would be entitled to custody in the best interest of the child, and a presumptive right to visitation,  “when the 
evidence concerning the child's best interests (as between a legal parent and psychologica l parent) is in equipoise, 
custody will be awarded to the legal parent .”   
 28 
parentage after considering equitable factors.195 The UPA de facto provision, importantly, is 
gender neutral as well, much to the benefit of parents who would otherwise be outside its 
purview.196 
The newest UPA’s de facto parentage language is, however, imperfect. States adopting the 
UPA (2017) should be careful to include a provision under the “best interests of the child” analysis 
forbidding judicial consideration of marital status or sexual orientation. Additionally, the current 
drafting allows only for the claimed de facto parent to seek relief.197 This creates the possibility 
that a de facto parent could decide to simply abandon their child and former partner without the 
obligation to pay child support. Indeed, the de facto provision serves only to protect the rights of 
the functional parent, should he choose to assert them. Absent this functional parent’s assertion of 
his parental rights, or some other formal recognition of parentage, this parent could easily escape 
child support obligations by simply declining to assert parentage. Acting as a parent is not simply 
about protecting one’s owns rights, but fulfilling the duties owed to the child, and state legislatures 
should include language to this effect when otherwise adopting the UPA (2017).  
B. The UPA (2017)’s Upgraded Holding-Out Presumption 
The newly-revised UPA amends the holding-out provision to apply without consideration 
of gender.198 Despite the similarities, there are subtle differences between de facto parenthood and 
the holding-out presumption.199 The holding-out provision is, in some ways, a codification of 
Stanley without the biological element. It recognizes a person who has openly proclaimed  
themselves to be a child’s parent and has resided with the child for the statutory period.200  The 
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provision estops the other parent, who has benefitted from this “holding out” of parentage, to deny 
parentage if the statutory period is met. Important to unwed couples, there is no requirement of 
marriage. So long as the cohabitation between the parents lasts for the statutory period, and the 
psychological parent claims parentage, that parent’s legal rights will be protected.201 
The provision, which has existed in some form since 1973,202 examines the conduct of a 
putative parent, allowing parentage recognition based on the adult’s treatment of a child as their 
own.203 Under the provision, a presumed parent need not be a biological parent, or even married 
to the biological mother.204 As such, the presumption granted by the statute is not reliant on  a 
biological tie to solidify inchoate rights, as in the unwed fathers cases, but instead grants standing 
to establish parentage regardless of biological tie by using gender-neutral language.205 While the 
UPA (2002) extended the holding out presumption to lesbian mothers, the updated statute, which 
speaks in term of the “individual,” will now plainly extend the presumption to non-binary 
parents.206 By using gender neutral language, it offers its protection to lesbian parents, while 
eliminating any potential argument that the law requires biological tie.207  
C. The UPA (2017)’s VAP Provisions 
Finally, the UPA incorporates gender neutral provisions for VAP recognition.208 
Historically, VAPs have been limited only to men, and are largely a product of federal law.209 As 
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women giving birth were, quite reasonably, presumed to be a parent to that child, VAPs were only 
necessary to solidify the father’s parental rights.210 To protect the rights of the “actual” father, 
many states adopted laws allowing only the biological father to assert parentage via VAP.211 This 
presents an obvious problem for same-sex couples, as nearly every child to a same-sex child will 
be genetically unrelated to at least one parent. The modified UPA addresses this by replacing the 
“paternity” language with “parentage,” and provides for parental rights of “an intended parent,” in 
addition to the “presumed parent.”212 The provision also includes no consideration of marital status 
or sexual orientation.213  
One potentially overlooked benefit to the new, inclusive VAP statute is that it allows same-
sex parents to seek a formal acknowledgment of parentage outside the adversarial system.214 De 
facto parenthood, and parentage via the holding out provision, will typically only arise in situations 
in which the unwed couple ends the romantic relationship and the “presumed” parent resists 
granting parental rights to the non-biological parent. As such, Section 301 provides an option for 
“intended” parents to establish their parentage prior to that occurrence.215 Doing so allows the 
intended parent to obtain a formal judgment of parentage, bearing full faith and credit 
nationwide,216 even if the presumed parent moves with the child to a state that would not otherwise 
recognize the intended parent as having parental rights.   
Importantly, the VAP provisions also remove the indignity of a same-sex parent being 
forced to second-parent adopt their own child. In doing so, it eliminates the unequal barriers to 
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parentage presented to same-sex couples as compared to heterosexual couples. Indeed, it is already 
rather standard practice for unmarried men to consent to VAPs to establish paternity.217 The gender 
inclusive nature of Section 301, therefore, does not create an additional legal barrier for same-sex 
couples, as is the case with second-parent adoption, but instead offers protection to unwed gay 
couples equal to their unwed heterosexual counterparts. 
Conclusion 
The dynamic realities of family composition have not, and will not, end in the post 
Obergefell world. As young adults continue to defy the restraints of the nuclear family or the 
institution of marriage, the law has failed to keep pace. Despite the clear victory of Obergefell, and 
all the justice it guaranteed, the emphasis on solving these family issues in the appellate court 
system seems to be, in hindsight, a strategic mistake. As state law is the primary means for 
regulating the family,218 these issues could be fixed all too easily, and we need not rely upon 
appellate litigation to do so.  
The fight for familial equality for our LGBTQIA brothers and sisters is far from over, 
despite the sense of victory we experienced the day Obergefell was decided. While same-sex 
marriage is the law of the land, parental recognition law remains insufficient in protecting the 
rights of unwed, same-sex parents. Obergefell was but one battle won. With Masterpiece Cakeshop 
on the books, and Fulton on the horizon, states need to take proactive measures to ensure the rights 
of same-sex parents remain protected. There is no need to rely on impact litigation, or the slow 
wheels of the justice within the court system. States can, and should, act today to expand 
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recognition of the functional definition of parenthood. Enacting the UPA (2017) will help them do 
just that. 
 
 
 
